This article outlines the premises and promises of a modern comeback of Stoicism, particularly the question of reinterpretation of the original doctrine, the contemporary intricacies of the principle of "following nature," and the foundations that modern Stoicism establishes for global responsibility.
Just as Pigliucci underscores, what is remarkable about the present boom of interest in
Stoicism is that it is not confined to the academia. The enthusiasm for Stoicism is surging among the general public. To this effect testifies the popularity of such books as mentioned Pigliucci' sHow to be a Stoic (Pigliucci,2017) ,A Guide to The Good Life by William B. Irvine (Irvine,2009 ),Stoicism and the Art of Happiness by Donald Robertson (Robertson, 2013) 
,or
Sztukażyciawedługstoików by yours truly (Stankiewicz, 2014) .These books focus not on the theoretical framework of Stoicism, but on the "philosophy of life" aspect of it. They propound Stoicism as a "life project," which anyone can set out to pursue in their own life. Such approach dovetails with the original intention of the creators of the school.
This wave of interest in Stoicism is also reflected in and organized by modern technologies and social media in particular. It is not an exaggerationat this point to state that there is a global movement of Stoicism and that the Internet and social media are widely used to advance it. There is the "Modern Stoicism" endeavor, which runs the "Stoicism Today" blog and the annual Stoicon convention, there is the "New Stoa" aka "Stoic Registry" which highlights that it was the first online Stoic community on the Internet (founded in 1996). And there are others. Individual blogs about Stoicism are too plenty to count. Stoicism also has a strong presence in the social media:as of this writing the group "Stoicism Group (Stoic Philosophy)" alone has 36 680 members.
What makes Stoicismso alluring today? On the theoretical level it proposes a neat "third way" between the two dominating ethical paradigms. According to Pigliucci, virtue ethics (and Stoicism as a part of it) constitutes "a viable alternative to the dominant Kantian-deontological and utilitarian-consequentialist approaches" (Pigliucci, Stoicism) . On the practical level, the boom of interest in Stoicismdraws from the perennial fame of Stoicism as a practical and useful tool to combat hardship and adversity. On this account it has been praised a lot, e.g. by Schopenhauer, who claimed that "the highest point to which man can attain by the mere use of his faculty of reason [...] is the ideal represented in the Stoic sage" (Schopenhauer, 1966, 86) .
The demand for a philosophy of life, particularly for one which makes human prosperityindependent from external circumstances and political conditions (just as Stoicism promises) has always been high. It is indeed, one may say, an intrinsic human need. That need is particularlyacute in our own turbulent times. Global warming, ISIS, war in Syria, social inequality -the list drags on. Historically, Stoicism has always been seen as a remedy to the hardship of any given time -the same holds for the 21 st century. While Stoicism's approach of clearly distinguishing things within and not within our power may not be the obvious vehicle of leaping progress in attaining the 'impossible' (although it can be argued to be a good starting strategy), it offers a sense of ease of individual's choices at a time when threats seem to be increasingly beyond our control. avoiding straight dogmas and encouragingvariousinterpretations. As the famous passages goes, "Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus could not agree in defining the act of walking" (Seneca, 1917 (Seneca, -1972 .23).
In this pluralistic Stoic world of conflictinginterpretations though,the majority assents to a view that some reinterpretation, or at least a debate about the modern specificity of the Stoic principles is required. It needs to be pursued if It is reasonable to suppose that stoics would have found a way to reject teleological physics and biology when scientific consensus did; that they would have found ways to hold their own against the attacks on naturalism launched in the modern era. And it is reasonable to suppose that the sheer variety of self-identified stoics over the centuries would have prevented, as it did in antiquity, the view that a stoic life is typically a bleak one (Becker, 1998, 6) .
In this landscape of reinterpretation one particularlyimportant problem is "nature."
"Nature," the principle of "following nature," and the ideathat, in the words of Marcus Aurelius, How does this play out in modern Stoicism? The reasoning I propose is as follows.
The previously mentioned reasons to doubt the ethical validity of nature hold. Yet, the commonality of human nature, or, to put it in more psycho-evolutionary terms, the realization thatHomo sapiens is a gregarious speciescan transcend these doubts. The focus on our shared On the other hand, we need to keep in mind that Stoicism does not prescribe any particular job, trade or profession for their adherents.Quite the contrary: there is a wide diversity of particular ways of life that a Stoic can follow, as long as her actions remain conformable to the Stoic principles of conduct. As Becker puts it:
It is important here, however, to quash the thought that the good life [i.e. stoic life -P.S.] we have in mind is in some disappointing way uniform; that it is, for example, always going to turn out to be a contemplative life suspiciously like a philosopher's. Not so. The stoics of antiquity were as diverse as plebeians and aristocrats, rhetoricians and physicians, career soldiers and career poets, apolitical logicians and political advisers, slaves and emperors. And while modernity has narrowed that range (and postmodernity, for all its flash and fury, has done nothing to reverse the trend), such narrowing is a local phenomenon. In principle, the diversity of possible stoic lives -and the lives of stoic sages -is very great (Becker, 1998, 21 ).
This "diversity of possible stoic lives" may sound normatively void (Stoicism doesnot compelits followers into any specific course of action), but it may also be read as an escape from the escape from responsibility (every individual needs to make autonomous decision and take responsibility for their course of action).
This begs anotherquestion: is this latitude for choice indefinite? Where is the boundary?
And here is the point. The limitations for this latitude, the boundary condition which narrows the Stoic paths to choose from is constituted by the commitment to the community, here understood not as any kind of locality, but as a social world. The boundary ofpolis is the boundary of the stoic world.
In other words, care and commitment for the interest of polismight be interpreted as the criterionfor what is and what is not agreeable with Stoicism. Stoicism allows a plethora of specific ways, "rhetoricians and physicians, career soldiers and career poets, apolitical logicians and political advisers, slaves and emperors," (Becker, 1998, 21) but it prohibitsthe ways which are not beneficial to the interest of polis. This produces a concrete criterion to discriminate stoic behavior from nonstoic, and it constitutes Stoicism as a ground for responsibility for the global polis.
The presented line of argument strengthens the position of Stoicism as not only an inspirational philosophyfor strengthening the individual, not only as a system of preparation for inevitable hardships of life, not only as a coherent framework for establishingone's particular values and goals, but also as an umbrella philosophy for human solidarity.
What is the possible weakness of this reasoning?
The main weak spot consists in that it rests on the assumption that the particular trait of being social is categoricallydifferent form all other traits characterizing human nature. Human beings possess all sorts of attributes: we are capable of language, we are not able to run faster than 30 mph, we are social, bipedal etc. In the reasoning presented above the attribute "social" stands out -it belongs to a different order of discourse than others.In a bit stronger version, the attribute "social" does not merely stand out but is different in essence. Our ability (or lack thereof) to run at a certain speed, the color of our skin, and the language we speak are basically contingencies, while the attribute "social" is posited as thehard, deep "ontological" reality of human nature.
This criticism might be further developed, possibly using the psycho-evolutionary approach in which all traits of human nature -all those mentioned skin colors, pedalisms and velocities -are on a par with each other, since they are all equally products of Darwinian evolution. On this take, the social aspect of human nature is just like any other and there is no reason for it to be treated differently.
On the other hand, there is solid ground to claim that the trait "social" holds a distinguishedposition among the available characteristics that can be attributed to human
